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Objectual Understanding, Factivity and
Belief
1. Introduction
Objectual understanding—viz., the sort of understanding one has when one un-
derstands a subject matter or body of information—is often thought to be factive,
in a way that (for example) mere coherent delusions are not. In short, under-
standing a subject matter demands we have at least some true beliefs about
the subject matter in question¹. That being said, it is ubiquitous to claim that
we understand some false subject matters or theories. For example, most
high-school students have some understanding of Ptolemy’s earth-centred
view of the universe, even though the Ptolemaic view is premised on a false con-
ception of what revolves around what. One very natural way to reconcile the kind
of factivity demanded of understanding with the datum that we can plausibly
count as understanding false theories, models or subject matters is to point
out a relevant fact about the way we regard ourselves as understanding (for in-
stance) the Ptolemaic view: we understand it as false,which is to say,we see how
the view holds together while at the same time appreciating that the view does
not accurately represent what it purports to.
After outlining a rationale for this kind of reply with reference to a particular
—and we suggest, very plausible—model on which to think of objectual under-
standing as factive, our primary aim in the paper is to engage with the compa-
ratively more complicated issue of what objectual understanding demands in the
inverse sort of case. Specifically, our focus will be cases where the central claims
of the theory itself are true, an individual sees how the theory fits together (in a
way that would ordinarily suffice for understanding), and yet does not appreci-
ate the theory’s central claims as true. For example, should we regard Lackey’s
(2007) ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does
not, given her religious convictions, believe it? We think this question raises a
range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between
understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a
 The term ‘objectual understanding’ owes to Kvanvig (), who distinguishes objectual
understanding from understanding-why (where the complement clause is a proposition–viz.., ‘S
understands why p), and propositional understanding (e.g. S understands that p).
principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating
what objectual understanding demands of us.
Here is the plan. §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—mod-
erate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding
should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand
false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated
straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the in-
verse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist
teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity.With reference to re-
cent work on moral understanding by Hills (2009), §5 proposes a solution to the
problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have
been led to draw the wrong conclusion.
2. Objectual Understanding and Factivity
It is generally assumed that propositional knowledge is factive (cf. Hazlett (2010))
in the sense that S fails to know that p if p is false. However, there is more room
for disagreement about whether objectual understanding is factive, where the
object of objectual understanding is not a proposition, but rather, is (or can
be treated as) a body of information (e.g. S understands Australian rules foot-
ball; S understands organic chemistry)². While it seems sensible to suppose
that some kind of factivity constraint would feature as a necessary condition
on objectual understanding, we might wonder just how strong a link there
must be between the beliefs an agent has about subject matter φ and the prop-
ositions that are true of φ.We shall briefly explore three different strengths that a
factivity constraint on objectual understanding might take, and in the course of
doing so will make a case for thinking the moderate of the three models is far
and away the most plausible³. The relevance of motivating moderate factivity
will be to contextualise the puzzles raised in the next two sections, which are
perplexing only in so far as they seem to suggest that moderate factivity
would (counterintuitively) have to be rejected.
On one end of the factivity spectrum, we can imagine a maximally inclusive
account—call this ‘weak factivity’—according to which one can count as under-
standing a subject matter φ even if none of one’s beliefs about φ are true. Zag-
zebski (2001) is tacitly committed to this proposal in virtue of allowing that at
 See Kvanvig (, chapter ) for discussion.
 See Gordon (forthcoming) for a fuller discussion of this topic.
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least some cases of understanding do not require any true beliefs; similarly,
Elgin (2007), in discussing the role the ideal gas law plays in the acquisition
of scientific understanding, allows that at least some items of understanding
might be (entirely) non-factive.
There are, we want to emphasise, several very serious problems with this
type of view. For one thing, this kind of proposal lacks (entirely) the resources
to explain certain elements of our linguistic practices of attributing understand-
ing. For one thing, the weak view has trouble explaining why individuals take
facts to be relevant at all to adjudicating disagreements about understanding.
For example, if A attributes understanding of quantum mechanics to B, and C
believes that the books B has read on quantum mechanics were in fact sham
books with false information, C will be inclined to disagree with A’s attribution
of understanding to B. However, if understanding is compatible with all false be-
liefs, as the weak view under consideration suggests, this disagreement would
make no sense. Relatedly, the weak view can’t account for our willingness to re-
tract former attributions of understanding, as when we find out that some of our
φ-beliefs were false. Even more, and perhaps most problematically, the weak
view allows cases of internally coherent delusions (e.g. made up stories that
fit together) to count as cases of understanding, no matter how wide the cogni-
tive gap between truths about φ and the delusional agent’s beliefs about φ⁴.
More generally, in light of these consequences, a weak, non-factive account
seems out of step with the common intuition that understanding is an especially
valuable cognitive achievement⁵. For example, as Kvanvig (2003, 206) points out,
‘we have an ordinary conception that understanding is a milestone to be ach-
ieved by long and sustained efforts at knowledge acquisition’ (see e.g.Whitcomb
2012 for agreement, who observes that understanding is often thought of a “high-
er” epistemic good)⁶.
In response to the apparent failings of the weak view,we might instead move
entirely in the opposite direction and embrace a maximally strong view of objec-
 It’s also worth noting that such a weak factivity constraint allows two people who deny all of
each other’s beliefs about some subject matter X might nevertheless be attributed an equally
good understanding of the subject matter in question.
 See Pritchard () and Carter & Pritchard (; ) for discussion.
 Perhaps part of the potential draw of a weak factivity constraint on understanding might be
explained by the fact that there is are closely related epistemic states that (while similar to un-
derstanding) does not involve a factivity constraint. The primary example might be intelligibility
(Riggs, ) or subjective understanding (Grimm, ), which merely requires a grasp of con-
nections between a coherent group of beliefs and lacks a need for truth.We consider this point
in more detail in §.
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tual understanding’s factivity—one on which understanding φ requires that all
of one’s beliefs about φ be true—and as such tolerates no false beliefs on the
subject matter in question. This approach has two advantages over the non-fac-
tive account: firstly, it accounts for the apparent epistemic desirability of under-
standing (e.g. understanding would certainly be epistemically valuable if permit-
ted no error) and, secondly, a strictly factive view could easily explain
disagreement and retraction data in the kinds of cases considered. Problemati-
cally, though, the strong view renders understanding very rare indeed. Experts
who merely happen to have one false belief about a minor area of their subject
fail to count as understanding on a strictly factive view. Even if such a view can
explain some cases of disagreement and retraction better than the non-factive
view, the strictly factive view does not square more generally with our practices
of attributing understanding, as we are generally happy to attribute understand-
ing of a subject matter φ to individuals who have some false beliefs about φ; this
is reflected in our tendency to view understanding as a matter of degree, with
some agents having poorer understanding of a subject that others (who nonethe-
less we also think of as having understanding).
Consequently, it seems like we should reject either of these extremes and
embrace something in between—a moderate factivity constraint. After all, we
have seen that not every belief relevant to an agent’s understanding of φ
needs to be true, even though there are obviously cases in which false beliefs
about φ will undermine a potential case of understanding. Kvanvig (2003;
2009) advocates this type of position (as does Wilkenfeld (2015), under the
name ‘quasi-factivity’⁷). On Kvanvig’s view, one can understand subject matter
φ provided all of one’s central beliefs about φ are true, thereby leaving room
for degrees of understanding and for attributions of understanding when the
agent has false peripheral beliefs (without leaving so much room that internally
consistent delusions creep in as cases of understanding, as they would on the
weak factivity constraint at the beginning of this section). Of course, a moderate
factivity constraint invites a range of interesting further questions, which remain
underexplored. In particular, we might ask what it is in virtue of which a belief
should attain the status of a ‘central belief.’ Similarly, a plausible substantive
moderate factivity account will need to have some principled way to distinguish
peripheral beliefs from central beliefs as well as from beliefs which fall outside
the subject matter in question entirely. It is beyond the scope of what we can do
 Wilkenfeld () defends what he calls ‘The Contextual Quasi-Factivity (CQF) of objectual
understanding’ according to which one understands object o only if one’s central beliefs
about o are true, where a belief ’s centrality is pragmatically determined.
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here to answer these more specific questions about how a moderate factivity
view would go. Our aim in this section is rather to show that something like
the moderate view (suitably embellished) will surely be a necessary condition
on understanding.
3. False Theories and Moderate Factivity
Consider the following two cases.
GEOCENTRISM: Helena, along with the other students in her Astronomy class,
learns about Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the cosmos, according to which the
planet Earth is the orbital centre of the solar system—that around which other
stars and planets revolved. Moved by the model’s simplicity and elegance, Hel-
ena goes above and beyond, reading the entire Almagsest and laboriously draw-
ing out maps of the Ptolemaic epicycles of the planets. On the exam, Helena gets
a perfect score.
WESTEROS: Having read (10 times) each of George R.R. Martin’s books in the A
Song of Fire and Ice series, Mark has a deep and extensive appreciation of the
inter-familial dynamics of the leading families of Westeros, their lineage and
the more general geopolitical climate within which each family is vying for con-
trol of the Iron Throne of the Seven Kingdoms.
On the face of things, it would seem as though GEOCENTRISM and WESTEROS
are going to pose some obvious problems for a proponent of the kind of moder-
ate factivity account put forward in the previous section. This is for the reason
that it looks very much like:
(i) both GEOCENTRISM and WESTEROS are cases where genuine objectual un-
derstanding is present; and yet,
(ii) in light of the falsehood of the central propositions constituting each subject
matter, moderate factivity is satisfied in neither case.
In support of claim (i), consider that that it would be very odd to simply deny
that Helena actually understands Ptolemy’s geocentrism or that Mark under-
stands the geopolitics of Westeros given that, by most any standard of assess-
ment, each has not merely become acquainted with, but has mastered, the sub-
ject matter in question. By attributing understanding, rather than something
less, in these cases, we are able to mark an important kind of cognitive achieve-
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ment that Helena and Mark have attained but which is not attained by individ-
uals who (unlike Helena and Mark) merely memorised bits of the relevant sub-
ject matter without seeing how the pieces fit together (e.g. as might one who, in
WESTEROS, learns that the Starks don’t trust the Lannisters and commits this to
memory, but has no conception of why this is so). Nor for that matter is this cog-
nitive achievement attained by individuals who have mere coherent delusions
about the subject matter in question (e.g. as might one who, in GEOCENTRISM,
believes the Ptolemaic view postulates the moon, rather than the earth, as the
orbital centre of all celestial bodies, and then forms an elaborate, coherent
but misguided picture around this false ‘moon-centric’ belief). So biting the bul-
let and denying (i) doesn’t look like a very promising way out.
Likewise, there is strong prima facie support for (ii). After all, with respect to
GEOCENTRISM, Ptolemy’s view is almost entirely false—certainly, the central
claims underwriting the Ptolemaic model are false (e.g. the claim that the
earth does not move). Meanwhile, in WESTEROS, unqualified geopolitical claims
about the place are categorically false because Westeros does not exist. It looks
very much like the propositions which Mark pieces together in such sophistica-
tion are propositions of the form ‘The Lannisters did X’ and ‘The Starks did Y’,
and these are, strictly speaking, false propositions, given that there were no
Lannisters and there were no Starks.
Obviously, if (i) and (ii) really are true, then it simply follows that moderate
factivity cannot, despite what was suggested in the previous section, capture a
plausible necessary condition on understanding. And so it looks initially like GE-
OCENTRISM and WESTEROS generate a kind of puzzle: moderate factivity is by
far more plausible than the weak and strong alternatives, and yet, if we grant (i)
and (ii), we have to reject moderate factivity as a necessary condition on objec-
tual understanding. So which of (i) or (ii) must be rejected?
Perhaps there are various ways a proponent of moderate factivity could con-
vincingly explain away the apparent tension posed by cases like GEOCENTRISM
and WESTEROS. For our purposes, we submit that a sufficient and appealing
way to reconcile these cases with moderate factivity is to accept (i) and then re-
ject (ii).
Rejecting (ii), via the kind of rationale we suggest, brings with it the benefit
of making it evident why false theories, as such, needn’t be de facto ruled out as
potential objects of objectual understanding, which is a pleasing result.
To a first approximation, what we want to suggest in the case of false theo-
ries is that, for an agent S and some subject matter F whose central claims are
strictly false, S understands F only if S understands F as (strictly) false. Corre-
spondingly, we suggest S understands F as (strictly) false only if S has a belief
(either occurrent or dispositional) that the theory’s central claims are false.
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Such a belief is important, as it de facto qualifies the mode under which the
agent is grasping the relationship between the propositions that constitute the
subject matter (a point we’ll unpack shortly). To make this point concrete, con-
sider briefly two variations in GEOCENTRISM:
GEOCENTRISM-Variation 1: Helena, along with the other students in her As-
tronomy class, learns about Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the cosmos, according
to which the planet Earth is the orbital centre the solar system, that around
which other stars and planets revolved. Moved by the model’s simplicity and el-
egance, Helena goes above and beyond, reading the entire Almagsest and labo-
riously drawing out maps of the Ptolemaic epicycles of the planets. On the exam,
Helena gets a perfect score. Despite her fascination with the geocentric model,
Helena is aware that the earth does not stand still, but in fact (as she appreciates
that Copernicus showed with the help of Kelper in the 17th century) revolves
around the sun⁸.
GEOCENTRISM-Variation 2: Helena, along with the other students in her As-
tronomy class, learns about Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the cosmos, according
to which the planet Earth is the orbital centre the solar system, that around
which other stars and planets revolved. Moved by the model’s simplicity and el-
egance, Helena goes above and beyond, reading the entire Almagsest and labo-
riously drawing out maps of the Ptolemaic epicycles of the planets. On the exam,
 We could envision a variant on this case, one that is a kind of ‘middle ground’ between GEO-
CENTRISM- and GEOCENTRISM-. In this middle-ground variant, let’s suppose Helena neither
believes nor disbelieves the view’s central claims, but withholds judgment. Perhaps,we can sup-
pose, Helena is in the process of comparing the Ptolemaic model with other models, and is wait-
ing for more evidence to come in before making an endorsement. In this case, Helena would
satisfy moderate factivity trivially given that she has no false central beliefs (i.e., she does
not, like Helena in GEOCENTRISM- believe the theory’s claims accurately represent the Solar
System.) However, she would satisfy moderate factivity in a way that differs importantly from
the way in which one might satisfy moderate factivity by never entertaining the propositions
in the first place. We think the appropriate way to articulate Helena’s position, in such a mid-
dle-ground case, is as having what we can call dispositional understanding; as with dispositional
beliefs, where a condition—namely, occurrent endorsement—activates the belief, likewise, ac-
tively taking a correct doxastic stand (rather than withholding) with respect to the central prop-
ositions about which one was previously agnostic activates the understanding. Given that the
variations with GEOCENTRISM involved a subject matter the central claims of which are false,
this will mean that Helena (in the envisioned middle-ground case) activates her dispositional
understanding upon believing (rather than withholding) of the central claims, that they are
false—something she fails to do when withholding judgment. Thanks to Heather Battaly for rais-
ing this kind of case.
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Helena gets a perfect score. Helena’s fascination with the geometric model leaves
her blinded to the Copernican evidence against it, and she believes that the theo-
ry’s claims accurately represent the structure of our Solar System.
On the rationale for rejecting (ii) which we want to propose, Helena satisfies
moderate factivity in Variation-1 but not in Variation-2. Given that, on Varia-
tion-1, Helena believes that the central claims characterising the Ptolemaic
view are false, the unqualified claims such as:
The earth is the orbital centre of the solar system
and
The sun revolves around the earth
which are false claims, do not accurately characterise the propositions Helena
(in Variation 1) actually believes, and the relationships between which she com-
petently grasps.
Rather, and to draw analogy from Sebastian Kletzl’s (2011) work on assertion
and testimony, the deeper structure of Helena’s beliefs in Varation-1 are (in light
of her belief in Copernicanism) to be read as qualified in the same sense that—
for example, and to use Kletzl’s case—a teacher leading a discussion on Plato’s
Parmenedies might baldly assert ‘X’ where the content of the teacher’s assertion
should be best understood as indirect testimony to the effect that:
According to Plato in the Parmenides, X⁹.
Analogously, in light of Helena’s belief in Variation-1 that the central claims of
Ptolemy’s geocentric model are false, the particular propositions Helena believes
are best understood as not the false unqualified propositions (the corresponding
beliefs of which would be in conflict with moderate factivity), but rather, true
qualified propositions (the belief-analogues of Kletzl-style indirect assertions)
to the effect that:
According to Ptolemy, the earth is the orbital centre of the solar system
and
According to Ptolemy, the sun revolves around the earth
 See Carter & Nickel () for further discussion on these kinds of cases.
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Understood as qualified in this respect, the original tension—premised upon the
idea that Helena’s understanding of geocentrism must involve false beliefs on
Helena’s part, given the falsehood of the theory, is dissolved.
Of course, an implication of our escaping the puzzle by rejecting (ii) on the
basis of the rationale we’ve suggested is that someone who pieces together the
Ptolemaic view of the heavens, while believing as the Ptolemaic view says that
the earth is the centre of the universe, lacks understanding of the Ptolemaic
view. (And, likewise, one fails to understand the geopolitics of the seven king-
doms of Westeros if one actually thinks that these kingdoms really existed, as
might one who was utterly clueless that this was a work of fiction by George
R.R. Martin, and thought instead the structure of the actual world includes su-
pernatural White Walkers, etc.¹⁰) But this, we think, is just as it should be.
It’s plausible to suppose that understanding, in the special case where the
object of the understanding is a false theory, simply can not permit a false
meta-belief (as Helena has in Variation 2 of GEOCENTRISM) about the subject
matter to the effect that the subject matter’s central claims are correct (when
these claims are false), even if we grant that the false meta-belief, itself, is not
part of the subject matter in question (and so wouldn’t itself violate moderate
factivity, which applies to central beliefs of the subject matter). The reasoning
here is that such a false meta-belief will entail that the agent’s first-order beliefs
(in Helena’s case in Variation-2, beliefs about the cosmos) are not merely quali-
fied propositions of the form (according to theory the Ptolemaic view, X…) which
are true, but also false propositions of the form ‘X’ (where these are unqualified
claims about the structure of the cosmos, which are false). And false proposi-
tions of this form fail to satisfy moderate factivity.
4. Creationist Teacher Case
Consider now, the following case:
CREATIONIST TEACHER: Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher,
and her religious beliefs are grounded in a deep faith that she has had since
she was a very young child. Part of this faith includes a belief in the truth of cre-
ationism and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite
 And, correspondingly in WESTEROS: Mark understands the geopolitics of Westeros provided
he is aware the work is in fact a fiction (in which case the propositions the relationships between
which he grasps are best understood as true propositions of the form According to Martin’s nov-
els… [X] and not false propositions of the form The Lannisters … [X].
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this, she fully recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of scientific evi-
dence against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she readily admits that she is not
basing her own commitment to creationism on evidence at all but, rather, on
the personal faith that she has in an all-powerful Creator. Because of this, Stella
does not think that religion is something that she should impose on those
around her, and this is especially true with respect to her fourth-grade students.
Instead, she regards her duty as a teacher to involve presenting material that is
best supported by the available evidence,which clearly includes the truth of evo-
lutionary theory. As a result, after consulting reliable sources in the library and
developing reliable lecture notes, Stella asserts to her students, ‘‘Modern-day
Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus,’’ while presenting her biology lesson
today. Though Stella herself neither believes nor knows this proposition, she
never shares her own personal faith-based views with her students, and so
they form the corresponding true belief solely on the basis of her reliable testi-
mony. (Lackey 2008: 48).
Lackey’s case has been used to argue, among other things¹¹, that the following
principle concerning the transmission of epistemic properties is false:
TEP-N: For every speaker, S, and hearer, A, A knows (believes with justification/
warrant) that p on the basis of S’s testimony that p only if S knows (believes with
justification/ warrant) that p. (Lackey 2008: 39–40).
Lackey’s key point in adverting to CREATIONIST TEACHER¹² in the service of
challenging TEP-N is that Stella’s failing to believe evolutionary theory is not,
contrary to what TEP-N says, a barrier to students’ coming to acquire knowledge
of the theory on the basis of Stella’s testimony. While Lackey’s much-discussed
case has been (unsurprisingly) controversial among social epistemologists as a
counterexample against TEP-N¹³, it is usually taken for granted by both sides
that Stella herself would not know evolutionary theory if she believed it was
false¹⁴ (and so this is taken for granted apart from the more contentious issue
 Lackey () has also used the case to argue against the knowledge norm of assertion (e.g.
Williamson ). See Carter & Gordon () and Lackey () for related discussion. Cf.
Benton ().
 For related cases, see DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR and RACIST JUROR.
 See Carter & Nickel () for a defence of this kind of counterexample against TEP-N
against recent attempts to defend TEP-N. Cf. however Wright (forthcoming) for a reply to Carter
& Nickel.
 For a heterodox position on this point, see Myers-Schultz & Schwitzgebel ().
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of whether Stella’s students could gain knowledge of Stella’s testimony despite
Stella’s failing to believe it).
Things with objectual understanding are quite a bit more complex, however:
that is, it’s less clear that the analogue to the point about knowledge accepted on
both sides of the TEP-N debate would also hold equally for (objectual) under-
standing. And this is because it seems Stella might very well be a candidate
for understanding evolution, in CREATIONIST TEACHER, even if we grant that
she fails to know the proposition ‘Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from
Homo erectus’ because she doesn’t believe it.
But in order to make this point, it will be helpful to make an amendment to
CREATIONIST TEACHER, so that features typically associated with objectual un-
derstanding are made more explicit, and then we’ll hold fixed that Stella, due to
her Christian faith, fails to believe that evolution is true. Consider now the fol-
lowing abridged version of the case (in which we promote her to university pro-
fessor, with a stronger pedigree in the subject matter than we’d attribute to a
fourth grade teacher), focusing only on Stella’s own epistemic situation with re-
spect to evolutionary theory.
CREATIONIST TEACHER*: Stella is a devoutly Christian university professor,
and her religious beliefs are grounded in a deep faith that she has had since
she was a very young child. Part of this faith includes a belief in the truth of cre-
ationism and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite
this, she fully recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of scientific evi-
dence against both of these beliefs. Stella, in fact, reads contemporary scientific
journals and regularly teaches advanced graduate seminars on evolution, where
students and colleagues alike admire the deep appreciation Stella has of how the
theory holds together. Moreover, Stella readily admits that she is not basing her
own commitment to creationism on evidence at all but, rather, on the personal
faith that she has in an all-powerful Creator.
Here’s a structural explanation of how CREATIONIST TEACHER* seems to pose a
problem for moderate factivity—in short, it seems very much like both of the fol-
lowing claims are true:
(i) CREATIONIST TEACHER* is a case where genuine objectual understanding
is present; and yet,
(ii) moderate factivity is not satisfied, even though the propositions constituting
evolutionary theory are themselves true
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And if (i) and (ii) are right, then we have to reject moderate factivity. Because re-
jecting moderate factivity is tantamount to embracing the very implausible weak
factivity account (one which fails to save the difference between understanding
and coherent delusions) the question is: should we reject (i), (ii), or both?
We’ve already suggested that it’s at least prima facie very intuitive to attrib-
ute understanding of evolution to Stella. It’s tempting to say that Stella’s demon-
stration of her competence (in teaching and in her scholarship) retroindicates un-
derstanding—viz., one cannot plausibly get to the point Stella has got without
understanding evolution.
On the matter of (ii): Support for this claim can be made with reference to
two kinds of doxastic claims—a negative doxastic claim, about what Stella
does not believe, and a positive doxastic claim, about what she does believe.
(The relationship between these points involves some delicacy). The negative
doxastic claim is that Stella does not believe various propositions that are them-
selves true and central to the subject matter. For instance, Stella does not believe
that modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus. (Compare: someone
plausibly does not understand the geography of the Great Lakes if that individual
does not believe that these lakes are located in the North American continent).
One retort to the negative doxastic claim is that Stella does possess a range
of true beliefs which, drawing from Kletzl’s indirect testimony analogy discussed
in the previous section, take the form:
According to evolutionary theory, [X]
where ‘X’ represents such propositions as Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved
from Homo erectus. As the retort goes, since qualified propositions of these
sort are good enough for Helena to satisfy moderate factivity in GEOCENTRISM
(Variation-1) in virtue of believing, then surely they’d have to be good enough for
Stella to satisfy moderate factivity in virtue of believing, in CREATIONIST
TEACHER*.
We think this retort is misguided. The Kletzl line was useful in showing how,
in the cases of false subject matters, the central beliefs the agents (e.g. Helena
and Mark) actually have are best described not as false unqualified beliefs but
as true qualified beliefs. Merely showing that Stella has some true qualified be-
liefs about the subject matter in question (e.g. such as According to evolutionary
theory, X, Y, Z …) does not suffice for demonstrating that Stella thereby does not
have any false central beliefs.
But at this point we can imagine a rejoinder. Suppose the proponent of the
retort considered were to argue: “Okay, so even if we grant that there are true
central propositions (unqualified claims such as Modern-day Homo sapiens
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evolved from Homo erectus) which Stella does not believe, it wouldn’t follow from
moderate factivity that Stella doesn’t understand evolution. Moderate factivity
says understanding is incompatible with false central beliefs, where as Stella’s
attitude with respect to the true unqualified propositions is just that she does
not believe them.”
In response to this retort, it will be helpful to compare CREATIONIST TEACH-
ER* with THEORETICALLY NIHILISTIC TEACHER*:
THEORETICALLY NIHILISTIC TEACHER*: Bella desires above all financial se-
curity and a comfortable life.While she recognises that she lacks many practical
and entrepreneurial skills that would be useful in the service of achieving these
aims, she comes to recognise (on the basis of theoretical aptitude scores) that
she has a natural proclivity for appreciating the nuances of evolutionary theo-
ry—something which does not in itself interest her in the slightest. Her desire
for financial security and a comfortable life leads her to publish extensively
on evolutionary theory and to receive an endowed professorship, which affords
her the financial security and comfort she desired. Bella has never cared whether
the theory is true and has not stopped to contemplate whether it’s actually the
case that Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus.
We want to remain non-committal on the matter of whether Bella counts as un-
derstanding evolutionary theory, in virtue of simply not believing the central true
propositions of evolutionary theory.We may suppose that Bella’s beliefs in THE-
ORETICALLY NIHILISTIC TEACHER* are best understood as qualified, just like
the true beliefs we can attribute to Stella, which take the form
According to evolutionary theory, [X].
Importantly, though—and this connects with the positive doxastic claim in sup-
port of (ii)—Stella is actually not like Bella in one very important respect. Stella
not only (like Bella) is such that she fails to believe various true (unqualified)
central propositions about evolutionary theory (e.g. Modern-day Homo sapiens
evolved from Homo erectus), but moreover, Stella positively holds central unqua-
lified propositions to be false. After all, Stella, due to her deeply held Christian
faith, while believing According to evoluationary theory, Modern-day Homo sapi-
ens evolved from Homo erectus is true, believes Modern-day Homo sapiens
evolved from Homo erectus is false. And so, in support of (ii), regardless of wheth-
er failing to believe true propositions central to a subject matter violates moder-
ate factivity, positively believing (as Stella does) that propositions central to the
subject matter in question are false, would be in violation with moderate factiv-
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ity, understood as a constraint to the effect that understanding is incompatible
with any central false beliefs.
Putting this all together, it should be clear now why CREATIONIST TEACH-
ER* looks like a much more difficult challenge for one wishing to uphold mod-
erate factivity than do the inverse sort of cases involving understanding of false
theories (GEOCENTRISM and WESTEROS). And so the remaining question is: in
light of the support we’ve seen for both (i) and (ii), and given that (i) and (ii) en-
tail that moderate factivity must be rejected as a necessary condition on under-
standing, which should we give up, (i) or (ii)?
What we want to now suggest is that the way out of the puzzle is to deny (i)
and thus, contrary to what is admittedly plausible, to deny that Stella (in CREA-
TIONIST TEACHER*) does understand evolutionary theory. A satisfactory answer
will of course require a residual explanation for why it is nonetheless attempting
to attribute to Stella understanding in CREATIONIST TEACHER* despite the fact
that, as we’ll argue, this attribution would be mistaken.
5. Diagnosis
Of course, one kind of argument for why we should refrain from attributing un-
derstanding evolutionary theory to Stella in CREATIONIST TEACHER* is very
simple: the simple argument proceeds as follows: moderate factivity is a neces-
sary condition on understanding; Stella (as suggested in the previous section, in
the support of claim (ii)) violates moderate factivity, and so therefore Stella
doesn’t understand evolutionary theory.
This kind of argument, however, would be dialectically ineffective in the con-
text of the puzzle raised in the previous section. The puzzle took the following
form: two prima facie claims (e.g. that understanding is present in CREATONIST
TEACHER* and that moderate factivity is violated in CREATIONIST TEACHER*)
imply that moderate factivity is false; and so as the puzzle went, because we
don’t want to reject moderate factivity (given that it fails to save the difference
between understanding and coherent delusion), we need to show which one is
false. An explanation for why either (i) or (ii) is false should thus be neutral
with respect to the truth of moderate factivity in the sense that any such explan-
ation must not appeal to the truth of moderate factivity. And so this simple argu-
ment is off limits in the present context.
What is needed is an independent reason, one which does not rely on the
truth of moderate factivity, to suggest that Stella fails to understand in CREA-
TIONIST TEACHER*. We now turn to providing such an independent reason,
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one which draws some inspiration from recent work on understanding by Hills
(2009).
Firstly, Hills’ (2009) discussion of understanding is situated within the con-
text ofmoral understanding, though the lessons that can be learned form her dis-
cussion can be applied mutatis mutandis to understanding more generally. Hills’
particular interest is to suggest why moral knowledge should be thought of as dif-
ferent from moral understanding, the latter of which she takes to be more valua-
ble; in drawing this distinction, Hills highlights a range of abilities the posses-
sion of which she regards as distinctive of understanding but not knowledge.
While Hills’ discussion of understanding and abilities is situated specifically
within the framework of understanding-why, rather than objectual understand-
ing, we can very plausibly generalise from these conditions. Of understanding-
why, Hills (2009, 102) writes:
The grasp of the reasons why p that is essential to understanding involves a number of abil-
ities: to understand why p, you need to be able to treat q as the reason why p, not mere-
ly believe or know that q is the reason why p. If you understand why p (and q is why p),
then in the right sort of circumstances you can successfully:
(i) follow an explanation of why p given by someone else
(ii) explain why p in your own words
(iii) draw the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the information that q
(iv) draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably p’) from the information that q’
(where p’ and q’ are similar to but not identical to p and q)
(v) given the information that p, give the right explanation, q;
(vi) given the information that p’, give the right explanation, q’
For Hills, possessing the abilities in (i)–(vii) are part of what is required to treat p
as the reason why q, something one must be able to do in order to understand
why p.
With reference to Hills’ criteria, we can straightforwardly show why Stella
would fail to count as understand-why evolutionary theory explains the presence
of modern day Homo sapiens, and from this, we want to suggest why an analo-
gous move suggests Stella doesn’t understand (in the objectual sense) evolution-
ary theory.
With reference to Hills’ criteria, Stella (in CREATIONIST TEACHER*) satisfies
(i) and (ii) but fails (iii) and (iv). She fails (iii) because she is not disposed to
draw the conclusion that that evolutionary theory is true (or that probably, evolu-
tionary theory is true) from the information about the presence of modern day
Homo sapiens. Likewise, where p’ and q’ are similar to but not identical to ‘evolu-
tionary theory’ and ‘facts about the presence of modern day homo sapiens’ re-
spectively, Stella is not disposed to draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably
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p’) from the information that q’. In light of the facts about present day homo sa-
piens, Stella in fact has drawn a strikingly different conclusion from evolutionary
theory, one involving an all-powerful god¹⁵.
Putting this altogether, on Hills’ model, Stella doesn’t understand why evo-
lution explains the presence of modern-day Homo sapiens because Stella (in vir-
tue of failing (iii) and (iv)) lacks certain dispositions needed to treat evolution as
a reason for the presence of modern-day Homo sapiens.
Let’s now transpose this kind of philosophical point to the arena of objectual
understanding. One helpful way to do so will be to consider Hills’ (2009, 102–3)
remarks, shortly after noting these various abilities, of what they—but not mere
propositional knowledge—afford an individual.
But I think that having these abilities is not the same as having extra pieces of knowledge.
Gaining this extra knowledge may help you acquire the requisite abilities, but you might
have the extra pieces of knowledge without having the kind of good judgement that enables
you to generate new true moral beliefs yourself. Surely no extra piece or pieces of knowledge
guarantee that you have these abilities.¹⁶ (Hills 2009, 103).
Transposing now the relevant context to evolutionary beliefs (rather than moral
beliefs). Is Stella (in light of her epistemic position with respect to the subject
matter of evolution and the corresponding abilities plausibly attributed to her)
able to generate new true evolutionary beliefs? We want to consider the case
 Consider, though, the following potential ‘contextualist’-style objection: that Stella could po-
tentially meet all of Hills’ conditions, if Stella was presupposing evolutionary theory within the
context of teaching. If she presupposes evolutionary theory, then she is in the position to draw
the relevant inferences, satisfying (iii) and (iv). However, when Stella is not in that context and
isn’t presupposing evolutionary theory, she won’t draw those inferences. On this kind of ration-
ale, (iii) and (iv) are failed outside of the classroom but satisfied within it. And so, contrary to
the line we suggest, Stella does understand, by Hills criteria, evolutionary theory, at least when
it is being presupposed.While we aren’t in principle opposed to a contextualist-style treatment
of understanding (though see Carter  for some reservations), we have two reasons to resist
the above diagnosis. Firstly, if being disposed to draw the relevant inferences is something that
would simply follow from (genuinely or properly) presupposing evolutionary theory, then it
seems unclear that Stella is presupposing evolutionary theory in the classroom. Ex hypothesi,
Stella is not disposed to treat evolution as a reason for the presence of modern-day Homo sapi-
ens, even if she is disposed, in the classroom, to teach what the theory says. If, by contrast, pre-
supposing the theory in the classroom does not entail having the disposition to draw the rele-
vant (i.e., to (iii) and (iv)) inferences, then it’s hard to see what work the inclusion of
presupposing in Stella’s narrative would do in the service of undermining the suggestion that
Stella fails (iii) and (iv) in the context of the classroom. Thanks to Heather Battaly for pressing
us on this point.
 Our italics.
436 J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon
for ‘yes’ and then to show why this case is problematic (and, in doing so, we’ll
offer some initial suggestions for why individuals might be tempted to attribute
Stella understanding even though she lacks it).
The case for thinking Stella can generate new true evolutionary beliefs (in
light of the situation described in CREATIONIST TEACHER*) is, firstly, that Stella
seems to be clearly in a better position to form new true evolutionary beliefs than
would be, say, a teacher who has merely memorised a teaching book but has
failed (as Stella does) to appreciate the intricate way the pieces of the theory
fit together. Following from Hills’, we might think such an individual (provided
she holds the relevant beliefs in question) would be a candidate for items of evo-
lutionary knowledge but not understanding, as we’d be inclined to attribute Stel-
la. The second part of the ‘yes’ case insists that Stella (despite not believing evo-
lutionary theory) has the ability to draw new true evolutionary beliefs because
she can (in virtue of the coherent picture of evolution she possesses) draw
new true beliefs of the form:
According to evolutionary theory, [X].
and further that these are new, true, evolutionary beliefs. It strikes us as a trap to
get bogged down in the semantic point of whether beliefs of the form According
to evolutionary theory, [X] is itself a ‘new true evolutionary belief ’ (in the sense
that is relevant to Hills’ point about what understanding affords us) or whether
only learning new unqualified propositions about evolution would qualify.
For our purposes,we want to highlight a very important limit on Stella’s abil-
ities to acquire new true evolutionary beliefs, a limit in place specifically because
Stella believes Not-[X] for most all the beliefs she has which take the form Ac-
cording to evolutionary theory, [X]. Consider that a full description of most of Stel-
la’s evolutionary-related doxastic attitudes takes the following conjunctive form:
According to evolutionary theory, [X] and Not-[X]
For example:
According to evolutionary theory, Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus
AND It’s not the case that Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus.
Because for every ‘X’ claim (where X is a claim of evolutionary theory) Stella be-
lieves this conjunction, Stella is deeply limited in the new true evolutionary be-
liefs she can learn via her competence with the theory. For every unqualified
proposition which she could learn about evolutionary theory (e.g. by applying
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what she grasps to new cases and new information) she fails to do so. She mere-
ly acquires new beliefs in qualified propositions. Even if these new beliefs in
qualified propositions ‘count’ as new beliefs about evolutionary theory, there
is in each case, exactly one corresponding belief (expressed by the unqualified
proposition) which Stella lacks the ability to learn, and this precisely because
she believes evolutionary theory is false.
To summarise the reasoning just put forward: to the extent that (a la Hills)
understanding involves the ability to learn new (relevant) propositions, Stella is
profoundly limited in what she is able to learn, and on the basis of this, we think
there is good cause to place an important wedge between Stella and individuals
who (unencumbered with her mistaken belief that evolutionary theory is false)
are able to learn unrestrictedly in light of the grasp they have on evolutionary
theory. To the extent that this is right, we have a principled explanation for
how we can escape the puzzle, without (illicitly) relying on the truth of moderate
factivity to make the point.
Moderate factivity, recall, looked in trouble because the following two claims
looked very plausible:
(i) CREATIONIST TEACHER* is a case where genuine objectual understanding
is present; and yet,
(ii) moderate factivity is not satisfied, even though the propositions constituting
evolutionary theory are themselves true
We’ve suggested that the best way to vitiate the threat to moderate factivity
posed by CREATIONIST TEACHER* is to deny (i), and so to say, contrary to
what might have seemed originally compelling, that Stella in fact does not un-
derstand evolutionary theory.
6. Concluding Remarks
We want to conclude with two final points, both aimed at diagnosing why we
might originally be inclined to attribute understanding in CREATIONIST TEACH-
ER* even though this is a mistake. The first point is that, at least in her capacity
as a teacher and academic, Stella is acting as if evolutionary theory is true, by
carrying on her intellectual activities as though the view is true. To the extent
that she does this, we naturally get the sense that evolutionary theory is some-
thing Stella uses regularly as a premise in practical reasoning and deliberations
(as these deliberations and reasoning would play out in the classroom). But
then, given the tight connection between practical deliberation and belief, it be-
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comes hard to see how Stella doesn’t (contrary to her protestations) simply be-
lieve the theory. Of course, and setting aside the psychological plausibility, it
is stipulated in the case that she does not believe the theory. The point here is
to suggest that one reason we might be inclined to attribute to her something
she’d have only if she actually believed the theory (i.e. understanding) is that
she is (in light of the details of the case) one we easily imagine as possessing
all the trappings of one who did believe the theory.
The second concluding remark is that we might be mistakenly tempted to at-
tribute to Stella understanding because Stella seems to attain a kind of cognitive
achievement which is lacked by individuals who (for example) merely believe
the key propositions of evolutionary theory on the basis of testimony but fail
to see how they fit together, or for that matter people who have a coherent
grasp on what they take to be evolutionary theory while (and unlike Stella) con-
fused about what evolutionary theory actually says. Stella’s epistemic situation is
defective in neither of these ways, and so this might lead us to think that under-
standing rather than something less would rightly mark Stella’s achievement not
shared in the other two kinds of contrast cases.
Following Riggs’ (2004) terminology—particularly his distinction between
understanding and intelligibility—we think the explanation for the attractiveness
of the line of thinking just stated is best accounted for by the fact that Stella has
achieved a kind of intelligibility that is plausibly a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for understanding. Intelligibility is attained when one pieces together
or grasps the items of information in a subject matter but regardless of whether
the agent has any true beliefs. For example, a defense attorney might offer a
tightly spun and very believable account of a series of events surrounding a mur-
der in ‘Case X’ which helps the individuals of the jury to make sense very nicely
of all the evidence shown in a courtroom over the course of Case X. By appreci-
ating the way the defense attorney’s story fits together, a juror might well attain a
kind of intelligibility she lacked previously, when confused about how the evi-
dence fit together. And this is so even if the defense attorney is clever but deceit-
ful, and so even if the story told is one that was simply made up. Such an ability
to grasp the relationships between the propositions is widely taken to be a hall-
mark of objectual understanding¹⁷, and so the presence of intelligibility attained
by Stella in CREATIONIST TEACHER* might plausibly explain part of the initial
pull to think Stella can understand EVOLUTIONARY THEORY* without believing
it: because she has attained a certain thing that one understands only if one at-
tains.
 See for example Grimm () and Kvanvig (, Chapter ).
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In conclusion, while ‘CREATIONIST TEACHER’-style cases pose a much more
difficult kind of problem for a moderate factivity constraint on understanding
than did the false-understanding style cases canvassed in §3, ultimately, moder-
ate factivity remains unscathed.¹⁸
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